Piety and Propaganda: The Soviet War on Religion
In the wake of the 1918 Revolution, the new Communist government embarked on sweeping reforms that extended beyond politics and economics to include a radical reimagining of the spiritual. Motivated by Marx's characterisation of religion as "the opium of the people," the state embarked on an aggressive secularisation campaign, aimed at eradicating entrenched religious traditions. With a conviction that the death of religion was demanded by history, the state used the law, education, propaganda, and terror to hasten its demise.
The state delivered their first doses of religious policy by decree in the months after they seized power, nationalising church lands and secularising the registration of births, deaths, and marriages. Next they turned to education. The Decree on Separation of Church from State and School, which came into force in early 1918, forbade religion from being taught in schools. The Party wielded it as their primary weapon against religion, aiming to sever the generational transmission of faith.
Schools became battlegrounds where the young were indoctrinated with secular ideologies, in an attempt to shield them from the religious influences of their families. In their 1920 book "ABCs of Communism," two prominent Bolsheviks, Nikolai Bukharin and Yevgeny Preobrazhensky - both of whom were later expelled from the Party and executed under Stalin - laid out a vision of the State’s anti-religious mission. In it, they wrote that “one of the most important tasks of the proletarian state is to liberate children from the reactionary influence of their parents…we must see to it that the school assumes the offensive against religious propaganda in the home, so that from the very outset the children’s minds shall be rendered immune to all those religious fairy tales which many grown-ups continue to regard as truth.” Curricula were stripped of religious content, and lessons on Marxist-Leninist ideology took their place. Schools and universities became centres for promoting atheism, with courses that explicitly aimed to debunk religious beliefs through scientific reasoning and empirical evidence.
While in the home, the secularisation continued, with the ABCs of Communism handbook which encouraged children to create an "atheist's corner" at home, complete with anti-religious pictures, poems, and quotes, which echoed the broader mission to supplant religious icons with symbols of the state. While the separation decree also proclaimed the freedom of religion, the resulting Soviet propaganda posters of the day promoted radical secularism and an almost persecutory anti-religious agenda.
The Decade of Terror: The dismantling of the Russian Orthodox Church
The state stepped up its anti-religious campaign in the late 1920s. They aggressively targeted the Russian Orthodox Church, aiming to eliminate its influence under the pretext of purging a Tsarist legacy. Arrests and executions of clergy were commonplace. When church leaders demanded freedom of religion guaranteed by the constitution, the Communists responded with terror. They demolished churches with ruthless efficiency, their numbers plummeting from 29,584 to less than 500 between 1927 and 1940. More than 85,000 Orthodox priests were shot in 1937 alone. The regime could not tolerate faith as a competing ideology, nor could it risk popular religious leaders inspiring or rallying the masses.
Religious figures were often branded as enemies of the state, even those who sought neutrality, like Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow. Despite his emphasis of political neutrality and disengagement, official propaganda twisted his words, portraying him as an autocratic sympathiser. Tikhon stressed the freedom of the Church within a separation of Church and State, alongside a believer's civic loyalty – as long as it didn't contradict their primary loyalty to God. Yet, propaganda relentlessly painted him as a counter-revolutionary threat.
The assault on religion extended to its material wealth. Lenin ordered the ruthless confiscation and sale of precious metals and valuables housed within religious buildings across the country. Yet, despite such brutal suppression, faith proved persistent. Even by 1937, official Soviet figures suggested that up to half the population still clung to religious beliefs. The relentless campaign began to falter. Anti-religious museums closed, university chairs of "scientific atheism" were abolished, and attendance at atheist lectures plummeted. By 1940, circulation of anti-religious journals dwindled, as did membership in the League of the Militant Godless.
The campaign slowed in the late 1930s and abruptly halted after the Nazi invasion in 1941. Stalin made a about-face, reviving the Russian Orthodox Church to stoke patriotic fervour against a common enemy. This dramatic shift, prioritising wartime survival over ideology, culminated in the 1943 meeting where Metropolitans Sergius, Alexius, and Nicholas were received by Stalin. The Church was granted the right to reconvene, and the Moscow Theological Academy and Seminary which had been closed since 1918 was reopened.
A New Idol: Science, Reason and a Space Odyssey
Despite brutal suppression, faith endured. This persistence of faith ultimately forced the Soviet propaganda machine to shift tactics in the following decades. Between 1945 and 1959, the number of open churches reached 25,000, signalling a temporary reprieve. However, in 1959, Nikita Khrushchev launched his own campaign against the church. Alongside forced closures of about 12,000 churches and the execution of an estimated 50,000 clergy, Khrushchev employed more nuanced tactics.
The state made a concerted effort to publicise and celebrate Soviet scientific achievements as proof of the superiority of the socialist system over the religious West. This was evident in the celebration of achievements in space exploration, nuclear physics, and medical advancements. These accomplishments were portrayed not just as triumphs of Soviet science, but as evidence of the irrelevance of religion in the modern world. Soviet art and literature were mobilised to promote this scientific worldview. Propaganda portrayed Soviet citizens liberated from the bonds of religion, confidently stepping into a future shaped by scientific discovery and secular principles, while films, novels, and paintings depicted scientists as heroes.
First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev famously referenced Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space in April 1961, in a speech to the Communist Party's Central Committee, using Gagarin's celestial journey to assert, “Gagarin flew into space, but didn’t see any god there.” This statement, often attributed to Gagarin, goes against claims that he may have been a member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite never making such a claim, propaganda posters often featured him alongside the message, "There is no God”.
Unforeseen Challenges: The Limits of Atheism
Despite initial convictions of religion's inevitable decline, by the 1970s it was clear something had gone wrong with this line of reasoning. Young people educated in the secular system were turning to religion in even larger numbers. This highlighted the necessity for a more nuanced approach. Propaganda evolved to acknowledge these challenges, adopting a tone that was at times reflective and self-critical, acknowledging atheism's failure to resonate on a personal level with the broader population.
Propaganda posters began to depict religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as an empty ritual, keeping people from enjoying their life. A typical poster in the collection shows a young boy being dragged to prayers before an icon by an angry grandmother in a darkened room. He hesitates as he looks out the window at a bright scene of young children with the red scarves of the Young Pioneers playing outside. Another approach was to portray religion as a scam, used to frighten people into giving the Church money. The implication was often made that the Church was full of corrupt leaders who did not care for the people, but only sought to get rich off of them.
Despite the vast resources poured into promoting atheism and scientific rationalism, the enduring pull of faith among the Soviet people highlights a profound truth: that belief, in its many forms, is a resilient and deeply personal part of human existence. Faith is seldom undermined by reason.